

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAKTO

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
REF: TOHAKS 104 and 107

FLASH

1. I agree that you should give the numbers on the SALT agreement to Ikle and Colby on a strictly personal basis. And I think we can go ahead with the numbers with the Congressional leaders, too, but we must emphasize to them the importance of keeping them secret until the exchange of notes has been completed.
2. I think that the idea of a Presidential letter on MIAs and Soviet <sup>incidents</sup> ~~incidents~~ in the Middle East is a bad one. Please tell the President that I think the best way to proceed is for me to raise these matters directly with Dobrynin upon my return.
3. A joint press conference on Martinique, in my view, would be a grave mistake, especially given the differences in style and outlook of the leaders. I think you should firmly discourage the idea and note that we can decide later about a joint communique.
4. On Jackson, I think we should invite him to attend with the other Congressional leaders, ~~though I doubt if~~

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

State Dept. review completed

*next week*

-2-

~~we can avoid seeing him alone as well.~~ <sup>must</sup> If we cannot ~~include~~  
~~him there,~~ then I would prefer that you brief him rather  
than Sonnenfeldt. Since we will be giving the numbers  
to the leadership, you will obviously have to give him the  
numbers, too. *This is essentially a Presidential*  
*decision*

7. Warm regards.

*E. Re Nixon I think you should  
tell the President what happened.  
Call Ziegler + tell him to call Nixon  
down. I was after all in Japan  
when it happened + Nixon should  
strengthen it.*

*E. Chinese would like to see you  
to visit. This is clearly out of the  
question but I would like to  
know if Ford invitation, having  
President approves, could we arrange  
it as a result of this visit.  
7. Please make sure it is not*

put out story of "tough" President  
and "soft" Secretary

**SECRET**

5W1004

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ WTE

DE WTE34 #0004 3301045

ZNY MMNSH

Z 261040Z NOV 74

FM SECRETARY KISSINGER //HAKTO 29//

TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT

ZEM

S E C R E T SENSITIVE

HAKTO 29

SITROOM: DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

REF: TOHAK 104, 107, 112

1. I AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD GIVE THE NUMBERS ON THE SALT AGREEMENT TO IKLE AND COLBY ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS. AND I THINK WE CAN GO AHEAD WITH THE NUMBERS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, TOO, BUT WE MUST EMPHASIZE TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THEM SECRET UNTIL THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

2. I THINK THAT THE IDEA OF A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON MIAS AND SOVIET INCITEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A BAD ONE. PLEASE TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT I THINK THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED IS FOR ME TO RAISE THESE MATTERS DIRECTLY WITH DOBYRNIN UPON MY RETURN.

3. A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE ON MARTINIQUE, IN MY VIEW, WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE DIFFERENCES IN STYLE AND OUTLOOK OF THE LEADERS. I THINK YOU SHOULD FIRMLY DISCOURAGE THE IDEA AND NOTE THAT WE CAN DECIDE LATER ABOUT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

4. ON JACKSON, I THINK WE SHOULD INVITE HIM TO ATTEND WITH THE OTHER CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS NEXT WEEK. IF WE CANNOT AVOID IT, THEN I WOULD PREFER THAT YOU BRIEF HIM RATHER THAN SONNENFELDT. SINCE WE WILL BE GIVING THE NUMBERS TO THE LEADERSHIP, YOU WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO GIVE HIM THE NUMBERS TOO. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

5. RE NIXON I THINK YOU SHOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT WHAT HAPPENED. CALL ZIEGLER AND TELL HIM TO CALM NIXON DOWN. I WAS AFTER ALL IN JAPAN WHEN IT HAPPENED, AND NESSEN SHOULD STRAIGHTEN IT OUT.

6. THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE SCHLESINGER TO VISIT. THIS IS CLEARLY OUT OF THE QUESTION BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TURN IT INTO FORD INVITATION. ASSUME PRESIDENT APPROVES. COULD WE ANNOUNCE IT AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT.

7. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT SCHLESINGER DOES NOT PUT OUT STORY OF "TOUGH" PRESIDENT AND "SOFT" SECRETARY.

8. WARM REGARDS.

580

#0004

**SECRET**

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAKTO

29

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FLASH

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER *Hk/ LABA*

REF: TOHAK 104, ~~105~~ 107, 112

*SIT Room: Deliver out copy of business*

1. I agree that you should give the numbers on the SALT agreement to Ikle and Colby on a strictly personal basis. And I think we can go ahead with the numbers with the Congressional leaders, too, but we must emphasize to them the importance of keeping them secret until the exchange of notes has been completed.

2. I think that the idea of a Presidential letter on MIAs and Soviet incitements in the Middle East is a bad one. Please tell the President that I think the best way to proceed is for me to raise these matters directly with Dobrynin upon my return.

3. A joint press conference on Martinique, in my view, would be a grave mistake, ~~especially~~ especially given the differences in ~~my~~ style and outlook of the leaders. I think you should firmly discourage the idea and note that we can decide later about a joint communique.

4. On Jackson, I think we should invite him to attend with the other Congressional leaders next week. If we cannot avoid it, then I would prefer that you brief him rather than Sonnenfeldt. Since we will be giving the

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

2.

numbers to the leadership, you will obviously have to give him the numbers too. This is ~~an~~ essentially a Presidential decision.

5. Re Nixon I think you should tell the President what happened. Call Ziegler and tell him to calm Nixon down. I was after all in Japan when it happened, and Nessen should straighten it out.

6. <sup>The</sup> Chinese would like Schlesinger to visit. This is clearly out of the question but I would like to turn it into Ford invitation. Assume ~~the~~ President approves. Could we announce it as a result of this visit.

7. Please make ~~a~~ sure that Schlesinger does not put out story of "tough" President and "soft" Secretary.

8. Warm regards.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAKTO 29

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT FLASH  
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
REF: TOMAK 104 and 107

1. I agree that you should give the numbers on the SALT agreement to Ikle and Colby on a strictly personal basis. And I think we can go ahead with the numbers with the Congressional leaders, too, but we must emphasize to them the importance of keeping them secret until the exchange of notes has been completed.

2. I think that the idea of a Presidential letter on MIAs and Soviet incitements in the Middle East is a bad one. Please tell the President that I think the best way to proceed is for me to raise these matters directly with Dobrynin upon my return.

3. A joint press conference on Martinique, in my view, would be a grave mistake, ~~even~~ especially given the differences in ~~my~~ style and outlook of the leaders. I think you should firmly discourage the idea and note that we can decide later about a joint communique.

4. On Jackson, I think we should invite him to attend with the other Congressional leaders next week. If we cannot avoid it, then I would prefer that you brief him rather than Sonnenfeldt. Since we will be giving the

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

2.

numbers to the leadership, you will obviously have to give him the numbers too. This is ~~not~~ essentially a Presidential decision.

5. Re Nixon I think you should tell the President what happened. Call Ziegler and tell him to calm Nixon down. I was after all in Japan when it happened, and Nessen should straighten it out.

6. Chinese would like Schlesinger to visit. This is clearly out of the question but I would like to turn it into Ford invitation. Assume ~~xx~~ President approves. Could we announce it as a result of this visit.

7. Please make ~~x~~ sure that Schlesinger does not put out story of "tough" President and "soft" Secretary.

8. Warm regards.

SECRET/SENSITIVE